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Introduction
Logistics is the foundation of combat power.
i In the words of General Dwight D.
Eisenhower, "you will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics". and providing adequate logistics subject matter experts in the theater with the capability of "reaching back" to their strategic counter-parts and "reaching forward" to the war fighters.
v The changes to organizational structure and manning level by subject matter experts, coupled with the establishment of a distribution process owner (DPO), will enable Combatant
Commanders to improve intra-theater logistics by bridging the gap between strategic and theater logistics. This paper will focus on establishing an organizational structure, utilizing the USCENTCOM JDDOC as a model, that is needed to improve logistical efficiency, effectiveness, adaptability, and communications rather than the necessary information technology (IT) required to advance the "real time" capabilities of the organization once it is established. Although IT transformation is briefly discussed and is a critical component in improving logistical efficiency, a complete discussion of the topic is better suited for a separate essay.
1 JDDOC is a generic term that defines a DDOC as a joint organization. Under the current system, a Combatant Commander maintains tactical control of their respective DDOC and therefore the first letter of the DDOC acronym is used to identify a specific AOR (i.e. EDDOC refers to the U.S. European Command DDOC). JDDOC or XDDOC are interchangeable acronyms that refer to either a generic joint DDOC organization or a non-specified AOR DDOC organization. For simplicity, JDDOC will be utilized for the remainder of the paper.
Logistical Lessons Learned from Previous Wars What did We do Wrong?
Contained in the title of a book written by the mastermind of the first Gulf War logistical effort, LTG William Pagonis, USA (Ret), are several words that best summarize the logistical process undertaken by the operation -"moving mountains". vi The "moving mountains" theory was characterized by moving large stockpiles of material to established points within the theater of operations for further distribution to tactical units. The size of the "mountain" to be transported was dependent on estimates of both the size of the force and projected consumption rates, which would be significantly effected by mission requirements.
During Operation Desert Storm, USCENTCOM received much larger stockpiles of material in the theater than was required to execute the war "just in case" the material 2 would be needed. vii However, the "moving mountains" practice was extremely inefficient, placed unnecessary stress on the finite number of inter-theater and intra-theater transportation assets, and increased the number of in theater logistics personnel required to effectively prioritize, sort, and prepare such large stockpiles of material for either storage or further transfer within the theater.
Despite its shortfalls, the logistical effort in Operation Desert Storm was truly amazing. The shear volume of material, 3.5 million short tons viii , and personnel moved over a short period of time was a significant accomplishment. However, the "moving mountains" logistical system, lacking the requisite organizational structure, unity of effort, subject matter expert manning level, and strategic level logistics support to efficiently accomplish the operational objective(s), had several inherent flaws that proved troublesome to U.S. military leadership.
In Theater Logistics Manning Level and Organizational Structure. The core of USCENTCOM's intra-theater logistics effort, which reported to the J4 staff, was the Joint Movement Center (JMC). Although authorized 33 personnel, the JMC was never manned by more than 28 personnel and consisted of an air element, an administrative element, and a surface element (figure 1). ix Due to the limited number of Service representatives and logistics subject matter experts within the JMC, the J4 staff had an extremely limited capability to cross inter-Service boundaries and establish priorities between Service requirements and joint requirements (figure 2). In addition, the in theater JMC/J4 staff lacked adequate representation from national partners (DLA) and major contractors to bridge inter-agency boundaries between the theater representatives and partners at the strategic level.
x Although DLA provides 85-90 percent of all consumable material to the DOD, it was not until 1999 that a single DLA representative Prioritizing Transportation Assets. The number of surface vessels and aircraft required to transport such large quantities of material and personnel over such large distances would place a tremendous burden on the finite number of available transportation assets. Due to changes in the timeline requirements to have certain amounts of troops and equipment in theater by the 30th-day, 60th-day, and 90th-day of the operation, the revised plan placed a large burden on the already strained air lift assets -the fastest means of transportation. Distribution Management. Once the material arrived in the theater, staging areas had to be established for further distribution to the tactical units. The logistical challenges of receiving, staging, preparing for onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) of large amounts of material often required material to be re-packaged prior to transfer within the theater, and was further complicated by a lack of identification and tracking tools. Without a clear prioritization system, there was no process available to establish delivery order, which in turn, affected the ability to proactively schedule limited intra-theater transportation assets.
xxvii Processors at these logistical distribution points often had no means of determining who the material belonged to, where it needed to go, when it needed to get there, and how it should get there. xxviii During Operation Desert Storm, it was estimated that over 28,000 of 41,000
arriving containers had to be opened on the docks to determine the contents since documentation on the ship's manifest did not match the actual content of the containers.
xxix
The lack of accurate manifestation forced the in theater logistics personnel to re-inventory all containers and quite often they were required to re-package the material for further distribution to differing destinations within the theater. xxx Prior to establishing the labor intensive re-inventory procedure, a large number of containers were hauled 2,000 miles across the desert only to find that 10 percent of its contents were intended for the front-line troops, whereas 90 percent belonged to the units back at the port were it just came from.
xxxi
The additional requirement for in theater personnel to validate the content of shipments, in a hostile environment, not only increased the work load but also posed significant security challenges.
In-Transit Visibility (ITV) and Total Asset Visibility (TAV). The lack of visibility on incoming material posed significant planning problems for intra-theater logistic planners. As well as reducing the number of divisions and branches (without reducing the overall manning numbers), the CDDOC added billets to the newly established divisions within the organizational structure in order to increase its capabilities (figure 4). The functions of the CDDOC were established to; (1) confirm the COCOM's deployment and distribution priorities; (2) validate and direct intra-theater airlift requirement support; (3) monitor and direct intra-theater surface distribution support; (4) adjudicate and identify USCENTCOM distribution and intra-theater shortfalls; (5) coordinate for additional USTRANSCOM support; (6) provide total asset visibility (TAV) and in-transit visibility (ITV) for inter and intra-theater forces and material, and (7) ensure effective retrograde of material from the theater.
lvi
The CDDOC made significant strides in overcoming previously identified logistics shortfalls that were identified in previous war efforts.
Unity of Command (Effort)/Single Logistics Command Organization: By creating a simplified and integrated logistical center organization within a Combatant Commander's AOR, the logistical efforts of all Services, agencies, and suppliers is focused, under one Director, on the goal of attaining the COCOM's objective(s). The CDDOC established a "bridge" for the COCOM linking strategic logistics to theater logistics. By retaining tactical control (TACON) of the CDDOC (figure 6), the COCOM was able to establish joint (including Service) priorities and utilize the most effective use of transportation assets within the theater to achieve operational objective(s). In the pre-CDDOC organization, the chain of command for prioritizing requirements between the Services, civilian providers (DLA/contractors) and the air, sea, and ground transportation elements was extremely complex and often disjointed. lvii The most efficient and effective modes of transportation were often not utilized. lviii In the first two months of its establishment, the CDDOC was able to prioritize joint requirements and use alternate intra-theater transportation assets, surface assets, to expedite over 1738 pallets of material intended for
Balad but delivered to Kuwait due to military airlift limitations. In addition, since the In-Transit Visibility (ITV) and Total Asset Visibility TAV). Although more work is needed in improving ITV and TAV, the CDDOC has made some significant strides. By testing numerous commercial products, the CDDOC has validated the ability to track material in "real-time". Using satellite tracking devices, the CDDOC tracked a convoy moving from Doha, Kuwait to Balad, Iraq. lxix With increased improvements in tracking material, the logistics command will be positioned to react and prioritize "on the move". Although ITV/ATV will significantly enhance the "visibility" throughout the theater, the information technology element of the logistics effort has made the least progress since its identified need following Operation Desert Storm/Shield. lxx To accomplish the implementation of a standardized supply system, the current splintered systems must be matured. With five million supply transactions and 9,000 customer queries occurring each day within the USCENTCOM AOR lxxi , the information technology element of the ITV/TAV requirement has a tremendous amount of development to be completed. However, USTRANSCOM has identified the need for information fusion 5 to improve the logistical process and has developed a time phased funding strategy to develop a joint world-wide nodal data-collection architecture that will fuse 129 logistical information systems into an integrated system. lxxii However, in the interim, by establishing ITV Coordinators within the Air Branch and Surface Branch, CDDOC has billeted three subject matter experts to use the current ad hoc spreadsheet programs to manually track ITV/TAV of incoming cargo. lxxiii The CDDOC possesses the capability to track material with current ad hoc systems; however, the capability is severely restricted by IT limitations. With technological advancements, the increased capability to manage data should reduce the workload and the manning requirement to operate such systems should decrease.
Synchronization. By following the TPFDD plan and communicating with both the strategic level and tactical level personnel, the CDDOC is capable of synchronizing the logistical evolution of an operation to meet the needs of the COCOM, and ultimately of the war fighter.
The ability to synchronize and effectively utilize the available transport assets with the TFPDD not only saves money but allows the COCOM to accomplish the mission while reducing the strain on particular modes of transportation. The goal is not to efficiently use the transportation assets, but to effectively and efficiently use those assets to position the required resources in theater to achieve the operational objective(s) of the Combatant
Commander. In the first three months of its establishment, from January to March 2004, by validating the time requirements of needed materials, the CDDOC was able to ship a large portion of material via sea lift vice air lift, which led to a $268 million cost avoidance for the Department of Defense (DOD). lxxiv In addition, it freed up the needed airlift assets for other priority lifts -both inter-theater and intra-theater. By "turning off" unneeded materials before it arrived and "turning on" unplanned, but needed materials, the CDDOC was able to save money but, more importantly, minimize unneeded material in the theater. With less material in the theater, the number of in theater logistics personnel required to manage it is reduced. A second case can be made that the CDDOC is too large of an organization to support and fund during peacetime operations. There is no need for such a large staff. This argument is correct, to a certain degree. Although the staffing requirements increased slightly, by capitalizing on already existing JMC and J4 staff personnel, the CDDOC only increased the entire staff by seven people. However, the need for subject matter experts that often demand higher salaries (civilian not military) is likely. Yet in the first four months of its existence, the CDDOC saved an estimated $375,000,000. lxxv This savings alone demonstrated the cost saving capabilities of the CDDOC and has proven to be a more cost efficient organization than the previous J4 staff. Lastly, as is discussed in the recommendations, the CDDOC manning requirements may be reduced during peacetime, at the discretion of the Combatant Commander, and activated and/or augmented during combat operations to assist in achieving operational objective(s). 
Counterargument

Recommendations
Conclusions
"Logistics is one of the most important operational functions in support of a major operation and campaign. Its ultimate purpose is to extend the operational reach for one's forces in order to prevent the adversary from extending the operational reach for his own forces. (CDDOC) is a large step in the right direction in managing logistical processes on an operational level, the concept must be adopted and tailored to the remaining Combatant
Commands to establish an effective and standardized logistical system that "bridges" strategic, operational, and tactical logistics to ensure that war fighters are properly supported.
Logistics organizational structure and information sharing are two critical elements required to "transform" the logistical system. The tailored JDDOC is the appropriate path to link strategic logistics to tactical logistics and will permit Combatant Commanders to more effectively project combat power.
Although only briefly discussed in this essay, information technologies must also be developed to establish a standardized and "real time" system to capitalize on speed and accuracy. The speed and accuracy of the logistic system is what will enable the Combatant
Commander the freedom of action to seize the initiative and maintain an element of surprise on the enemy.
The CDDOC, although fairly immature in its development, is an organization that has demonstrated the capability of improving intra-theater logistical efficiencies and should be used as a model to establish tailored Joint Deployment Distribution Operation Centers (JDDOCs) for the remaining four Combatant Commands.
